Editor's note: Xiang Haoyu is a specially appointed research fellow at the Department for Asia-Pacific Studies, China Institute of International Studies. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily the views of CGTN.

August 6 and 9 mark the 81st anniversaries of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Domestic debate over nuclear policy is intensifying across Japan. Polls show 76% of Japanese respondents still back the post-war Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Local assemblies and atomic-bomb survivor groups have warned the government not to cross the non-nuclear red line. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi has publicly argued Japan should "debate nuclear-related policies without taboos." The Sanae Takaichi administration seeks to revise the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and repeatedly tests limits on sensitive issues such as nuclear-powered submarines and nuclear sharing.

This rift over nuclear policy exposes the core internal contradiction of Japan's post-war security strategy: a country leveraging its moral standing as a nuclear-bomb victim is drifting dangerously toward nuclear armament.

The inherent paradox

The trauma of Hiroshima and Nagasaki made anti-nuclear sentiment one of post-war Japan's most unifying collective memories and moral benchmarks. Mainstream public rejection of nuclear weapons stems not only from reflections on wartime horror, but also underpins Japan's identity as a self-proclaimed "peace state." Yet senior Japanese politicians are increasingly out of step with public opinion on nuclear policy.

Koizumi's call for open, unrestricted nuclear-policy debate was no offhand remark. It represents a calculated policy probe by Japan's right-wing political forces. Since taking office last October, Sanae Takaichi has given evasive answers in parliamentary questioning on the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Prime ministerial aides and senior ruling-party figures have repeatedly raised the issue of nuclear armament. Japanese elites deploy a familiar playbook: floating trial balloons, dismantling rhetorical taboos and driving substantive policy change to break post-war nuclear constraints.

This gap between political elites and public opinion lays bare Japan's distorted political landscape. Grassroots anti-nuclear pacifism has never become a binding rule for Japan's conservative governments. The "nuclear-victim state" label is largely a diplomatic tool: it secures the moral high ground internationally while whitewashing historical guilt. Framing its neighborhood security environment as deteriorating, Japanese elites view shedding post-war shackles and pursuing independent defense – even nuclear deterrence – as a shortcut to shake off the post-war order and become a so-called "normal major power." Japan's post-war pacifism faces grave peril.

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles risk being hollowed out

To grasp Japan's nuclear ambitions, one must examine the history and contradictions of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. In 1967, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato laid down the principles: not to possess, produce or introduce nuclear weapons. The policy itself emerged from political compromise: the Japanese government balanced strong domestic anti-nuclear pressure against its strategic priority of reinforcing the Japan-US security treaty.

From its inception, however, the framework was deeply hypocritical. Declassified post-war files confirm that shortly after the principles were announced, Tokyo and Washington struck a secret deal. Japan tacitly allowed US nuclear-armed warships and aircraft to dock and transit Japanese territory. While publicly promising no nuclear imports to its citizens, Japan quietly opened its doors to US nuclear deployments.

On the global stage, Japan invokes its status as "the only country hit by atomic bombs" to demand full nuclear disarmament. In practice, its security strategy relies heavily on US extended nuclear deterrence. This inconsistency creates blatant diplomatic double standards. In recent years, politicians have floated a NATO-style nuclear-sharing model. Both the "no introduction" and "no possession" clauses risk being hollowed out. By hitching itself to US nuclear capabilities, senior officials seek an end-run around post-war nuclear taboos and turn Japan into a de facto nuclear-capable state.

The shock of Japan's 'Nuclear Unshackling'

The Takaichi government's nuclear-policy moves this year signal Japan's shift from covert nuclear posturing to open nuclear loosening. Ambiguity around non-nuclear commitments in revised national-security documents, paired with right-wing pushes for nuclear-powered submarines and nuclear sharing, show Tokyo eroding post-war security guardrails through a classic salami-slicing strategy. Loosening the Three Non-Nuclear Principles to boost nuclear deterrence – and ultimately pursue nuclear weapons – would unleash three catastrophic consequences for regional and global security.

First, it will destabilize the Northeast Asian security order. Concrete steps toward nuclear sharing or nuclear armament would upend decades-long military balances in Northeast Asia. Far from improving Japan's security, such moves will fuel great-power strategic suspicion and drag the region toward a new Cold War.

Second, it will spark a destructive arms race. Japan holds large civilian plutonium stockpiles and commands advanced nuclear and rocket-launch technologies. The international community classifies it as a threshold nuclear state capable of building nuclear weapons on short notice. Any domestic nuclear-policy relaxation will trigger regional ripple effects, prompting neighbors to strengthen their own nuclear deterrence and ignite a full-blown nuclear arms race.

Third, it will undermine the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. As a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), any Japanese move to import, share or develop nuclear weapons would constitute a flagrant breach of the treaty. Such action would cripple the authority and effectiveness of the non-proliferation system and set off cascading proliferation risks worldwide.

Japan's legacy as a nuclear-bomb victim ought to be a powerful driver for global nuclear disarmament. Instead, nuclear ambitions twist this painful history into a fig leaf for military expansion. Japan's true security cannot rest on blind faith in nuclear deterrence. It must come from a sincere reckoning with history and trust-building, peace diplomacy with its neighbors. Should Japan keep taking dangerous nuclear gambles, it will lose international trust and lock itself into an inescapable security dilemma.