This summer the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has turned 25. In the very beginning of the 21st century, when leaders of the six SCO initial members got together at the Pudong Shangri-La Hotel on the Huangpu River waterfront in Lujiazui, the international environment was very different from what it is now. The SCO founding members might have had optimistic expectations about future developments in the world at large and in Eurasia in particular. Unfortunately, the geopolitical and the geoeconomic circumstances of today are in many ways much less encouraging and much more challenging than they were a quarter of a century ago. And yet, the SCO has not only survived the hard times, but has become one of the solid cornerstones of the emerging continental and global international order.

With 25 years of SCO history behind us, and with the annual summit about to open in Bishkek from Monday to Tuesday, we have some reasons to predict about the future SCO trajectory. It is quite clear that the body has a bumpy road ahead, but are we in a position to discern its destination? What will the SCO look like in 2051, when it turns 50?

It seems logical to assume that the number of SCO members will continue to steadily grow. The initial "club of six" has already turned into "the club of 10" and there's no reason to believe that the group will abruptly shut the door in front of the potential membership applicants. SCO Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev stated that roughly 20 applications are in the pipeline for some form of affiliation - membership, partnership or a status change. By 2051 we might see the "Shanghai club" adding five, 10 or even more new full members.

Right now, the SCO is merging the categories of "observer" and "dialogue partner" into a single category, but this merger should not imply that future SCO partners will have less flexibility in defining the exact scope and the format of interacting with the core group of members. The more nations are involved in multilateral Eurasian projects, the more international legitimacy and credibility the organization gains.

Is the SCO going to change its general mandate over the next 25 years? Probably not. Though the scope of SCO strategic priorities and its ongoing activities might look broad and even ambiguous, this should be regarded as an institutional asset rather than as a liability. The range and the diversity of security challenges and development opportunities that SCO members are going to confront in years to come is likely to significantly increase. Moreover, both challenges and opportunities may pop up quite unexpectedly, which means this organization will enjoy a comparative advantage over more "specialized" multilateral bodies and institutions if it remains an organization for all seasons.

Yet, keeping a broad mandate is not enough to secure SCO efficiency for another quarter of a century. It is no less important to keep upgrading its institutional capacities. The SCO has a secretariat with its own headquarters, permanent staff and administrative budget. The decision to establish the SCO Development Bank was made at the Tianjin Summit in September 2025. A specific roadmap may be further discussed at the Bishkek Summit.

SCO member states will continue to work hard on an institutional upgrade of other tools that the group already has in its toolkit. For example, during the Tianjin Summit, member states signed the Agreement on the Universal Centre for Countering Challenges and Threats to the Security of SCO Member States and the Agreement on the SCO Anti-Drug Centre. Member states noted the proposal to establish a Centre for Strategic Studies in the field of security. These should be further elaborated and specified in Bishkek.

Another important test of the SCO efficiency in years to come will be its ability to interact with other universal and regional multilateral organizations, bodies and initiatives, avoiding overlapping authority or duplicating of functions. The Eurasian continent is big enough to accommodate multiple actors - from the UN to ASEAN, and from the Belt and Road Initiative to the Eurasian Economic Union. They do not need to compete with each other; instead, they should compose a think net of interlocking mechanisms serving diverse security and development needs of Eurasian nations. The SCO's flexibility and adaptability should allow the body to serve as a continental project integrator involving diverse actors around specific problems and opportunities.

The forthcoming Bishkek summit takes stock of the first 25 years of the SCO existence. At the same time, the summit paves the way to the next 25-year chapter of SCO history. There are many reasons that indicate the second chapter will be no less exciting or productive as the first.